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In most of the period since the mid-1990s, external sector developments in India have been 
marked by strong capital flows. Capital inflows, which were earlier mainly confined to small-
scale official concessional finance, gained momentum from the 1990s after the initiation of 
economic reforms. As well as increasing in size, capital inflows have undergone a 
compositional shift from predominantly official and private debt flows to non-debt-creating 
flows in the post-reform period. Private debt flows have begun to increase again in the more 
recent period. Though capital flows are generally seen to be beneficial to an economy, a 
large surge over a short span of time in excess of domestic absorptive capacity can be a 
source of stress, leading to upward pressure on the exchange rate, overheating of the 
economy and possible asset price bubbles. In India, capital flows in the past few years 
increased sharply and have been well above the current account deficit, which has largely 
remained modest. This has posed new challenges for monetary and exchange rate 
management.  
This paper elaborates on various aspects of capital flows to India and their policy 
implications. The sections have been arranged as follows: Section I provides a historical 
backdrop to the evolution of capital inflows. Section II analyses their trend, magnitude and 
composition. Section III examines the management of capital inflows and their implications 
for the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policies. Section IV highlights some of the 
major issues and challenges for the central bank, and Section V concludes with the future 
outlook. 
I. Historical  backdrop 
For the first four decades after independence in 1947, the economic policies of the Indian 
government were characterised by planning, control and regulation. Until the 1980s, India’s 
development strategy was focused on self-reliance and import substitution. There were 
periodic attempts at market-oriented reform, usually following balance of payments 
pressures, which induced policy responses that combined exchange rate depreciation and 
an easing of restrictions on foreign capital inflows. However, these controls were relatively 
narrow in scope and had little impact on actual inflows, which remained small. The situation 
changed dramatically with the onset of reform programmes introduced in the early 1990s in 
the aftermath of the balance of payments crisis of 1991. 
Broadly speaking, India’s approach towards external capital flows can be divided into three 
main phases. In the first phase, starting at the time of independence and spanning up to the 
early 1980s, India’s reliance on external flows was mainly restricted to multilateral and 
bilateral concessional finance. Subsequently, however, in the context of a widening current 
account deficit during the 1980s, India supplemented this traditional external source of 
financing with recourse to external commercial loans, including short-term borrowings and 
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deposits from non-resident Indians (NRIs). As a result, the proportion of short-term debt in 
India’s total external debt had increased significantly by the late 1980s. The third phase was 
marked by the balance of payments crisis of 1991 and the initiation of the reform process. 
The broad approach to reform in the external sector was based on the recommendations 
made in the Report of the High Level Committee on Balance of Payments (Chairman: 
C Rangarajan), 1991. The objectives of reform in the external sector were conditioned by the 
need to correct the deficiencies that had led to payment imbalances in 1991. Recognising 
that an inappropriate exchange rate regime, unsustainable current account deficit and a rise 
in short-term debt in relation to official reserves were amongst the key contributing factors to 
the crisis, a series of reform measures were put in place. They included a swift transition to a 
market-determined exchange rate regime, dismantling of trade restrictions, a move towards 
current account convertibility and a gradual opening-up of the capital account. While 
liberalising private capital inflows, the Committee recommended, inter alia: a compositional 
shift away from debt to non-debt-creating flows; strict regulation of external commercial 
borrowings, especially short-term debt; discouragement of the volatile element of flows from 
NRIs; and a gradual liberalisation of outflows.  
Among the components, since the 1990s, the broad approach towards permitting foreign 
direct investment has been through a dual route, ie automatic and discretionary, with the 
ambit of the automatic route being progressively enlarged to almost all the sectors, coupled 
with higher sectoral caps stipulated for such investments. Portfolio investments are restricted 
to institutional investors. The approach to external commercial borrowings has been one of 
prudence, with self-imposed ceilings on approvals and a careful monitoring of the cost of 
raising funds as well as their end use. In respect of NRI deposits, some modulation of inflows 
is exercised through specification of interest rate ceilings and maturity requirements. In 
respect of capital outflows, the approach has been to facilitate direct overseas investment 
through joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries, and through the provision of financial 
support to exports, especially project exports from India. Ceilings on such outflows have 
been substantially liberalised over time. The limits on remittances by domestic individuals 
have also been eased. With the progressive opening-up since the early 1990s, the capital 
account in India today can be considered as the most liberalised it has ever been since the 
late 1950s. 
The process of capital account liberalisation is managed by keeping in view the elasticities of 
supply and other responses in the economy, and vulnerabilities or potential shocks. The 
issue is handled with extreme caution given the potential for sudden capital reversals. The 
1997 Report of the Committee on Capital Account Convertibility (Chairman: S S Tarapore) 
provided the initial framework for the liberalisation of capital account transactions in India. 
The Committee recommended a phased implementation of capital account convertibility, to 
be completed by the year 1999/2000. Drawing on international experience, the Committee 
suggested a number of preconditions needed to be met for the capital account liberalisation 
programme to succeed: fiscal consolidation, lower inflation and a stronger financial system 
were seen as crucial signposts. It is interesting to note that the Committee did not 
recommend unlimited opening-up of the capital account, but preferred a phased liberalisation 
of controls on outflows and inflows over a three-year period. Even at the end of the three-
year period, the capital account was not to be fully open and some flows, especially debt 
flows, would continue to be managed.   
The issue of capital account liberalisation was re-examined by the Committee on Fuller 
Capital Account Convertibility (Chairman Shri S S Tarapore) (2006), which made several 
recommendations on the development of financial markets in addition to addressing issues 
related to interaction of monetary policy and exchange rate management, 
regulation/supervision of banks and the timing and sequencing of capital account 
liberalisation measures (for details, see Section III.3). The Committee recommended that at 
the end of the five-year period ending in 2010/11, there should be a comprehensive review to 
chalk out the future course of action.  BIS Papers No 44  237
 
 
II.  Trend, magnitude and composition of capital flows to India 
II.1 Trend 
Since the introduction of the reform process in the early 1990s, India has witnessed a 
significant increase in cross-border capital flows, a trend that represents a clear break from 
the previous two decades. Net capital inflows increased from $7.1 billion
2 in 1990/91 to 
$45.8 billion in 2006/07, and further to $108.0 billion during 2007/08 (Graph 1). India has one 
of the highest net capital flows among the emerging market economies (EMEs) of Asia. 
II.2 Magnitude 
Net capital inflows, which increased from 2.2% of GDP in 1990/91 to around 9% in 2007/08, 
do not, however, reflect the true magnitude of capital flows to India. Gross capital inflows, as 
a percentage of GDP, have undergone a more than fivefold increase from 7.2% in 1990/91 to 
36.6% in 2007/08. Much of this increase has been offset by corresponding capital outflows, 
largely on account of foreign institutional investors’ (FIIs) portfolio investment transactions, 
Indian investment abroad and repayment of external borrowings. Capital outflows increased 
from 5.0% of GDP in 1990/91 to 27.4% of GDP in 2007/08. The gross volume of capital 
inflows amounted to $428.7 billion in 2007/08 as against an outflow of $320.7 billion.  
Graph 1 
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Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
Strong capital flows to India in the recent period reflect the sustained momentum in domestic 
economic activity, better corporate performance, the positive investment climate, the long-
term view of India as an investment destination, and favourable liquidity conditions and 
interest rates in the global market. Apart from this, the prevailing higher domestic interest 
rate along with a higher and stable growth rate have created a lower risk perception, which 
has attracted higher capital inflows. 
The large excess of capital flows over and above those required to finance the current 
account deficit (which is currently around 1.5% of GDP) resulted in reserve accretion of 
$110.5 billion during 2007/08. India’s total foreign exchange reserves were $308.4 billion as 
of 4 July 2008.  
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II.3 Composition   
As regards the composition of capital flows, the thrust of the policy reform in India in the 
aftermath of the balance of payments crisis was to encourage non-debt-creating flows and 
discourage short-term debt flows. Accordingly, the composition of capital inflows to India 
clearly reflects a shift towards non-debt-creating flows. The substantial contribution of 
external aid towards the capital account in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s has dwindled 
steadily since the 1990s (excluding IMF loans in 1991 and 1992) as the official flows started 
to be replaced by private equity flows and external commercial borrowing (Table 1). Although 
non-debt flows, particularly private foreign investments, have gained in importance, there has 
also been a significant rise in debt-creating flows in last two years, mainly on account of a 
rise in external commercial borrowings by Indian corporates (Table 2).  
 
Table 1 
External financing in India 
In millions of US dollars 
  1990/91 2000/01 2003/04 2005/06 
PR  2006/07 P  2007/08 P
Current account balance  –9,680 –2,666 14,083 –9,902 –9,766  –17,407 
As a percentage of GDP  –3.1 –0.6  2.3 –1.2 –1.1 –1.5 
Net capital flows  7,056  8,840 16,736 25,470 45,779  108,031 
of which        
1. Foreign direct investment             
Inflows 107  4,101 4,464 9,178  22,959  34,924 
Outflows 10  829  2,076 6,144  14,480  19,379 
Net  97  3,272 2,388 3,034 8,479  15,545 
2. Foreign portfolio 
investment        
Inflows 6  13,619 28,218 68,120  109,622  235,630 
Outflows 0  11,029 16,862 55,626  102,560  206,369 
Net  6  2,590 11,356 12,494  7,062 29,261 
3.  External  assistance        
Inflows  3,397 2,941 3,350 3,607 3,747 4,241 
Outflows  1,193 2,531 6,208 1,841 1,960 2,127 
Net  2,204  410  –2,858 1,766 1,787 2,114 
4. External commercial 
borrowings        
Inflows  4,282  9,621  5,228 14,343 20,973 29,851 
Outflows  2,028 5,318 8,153  11,835 4,818 7,686 
Net  2,254  4,303 –2,925  2,508 16,155 22,165 
5. NRI deposits             
Inflows  7,348  8,988 14,281 17,835 19,914 29,321 
Outflows  5,811  6,672 10,639 15,046 15,593 29,142 
Net  1,537 2,316 3,642 2,789 4,321  179 
PR = partially revised; P = preliminary. Figures for foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment 
include gross inflows and gross outflows on account of foreign investments in India as well as Indian 
investment abroad. Similarly, figures for external assistance and external commercial borrowings include gross 
inflows and gross outflows on account of foreign borrowings as well as overseas lending by Indian entities. 
Large outflows under external commercial borrowings during 2005/06 reflect the one-off effect of the principal 
repayment of $5.2 billion on account of redemption of India Millennium Deposit bonds. 
Source: Reserve Bank of India. 




Composition of capital inflows to India 
  1990/91 2000/01 2003/04 2005/06  2006/07  P  2007/08P
Net capital flows (US$ 
millions)  7,056 8,840  16,736  25,470  45,779  108,031 
of which (in per cent)        
1. Non-debt-creating flows  1.5 66.3 82.1 73.6 34.5 41.5 
a) Foreign direct 
investment  1.4 37.0 14.3 20.2 18.8 14.4 
b) Foreign portfolio 
investment  0.1 29.3 67.9 53.4 15.7 27.1 
2. Debt-creating flows  71.1 30.3  7.7 29.6 51.2 49.6 
a) External assistance  31.2 4.6  –17.1 7.2 3.9 1.9 
b) External commercial 
borrowings
1  31.9 48.7  –17.5 11.6 35.8 20.5 
c) Short-term credits  15.2 6.2 8.5 7.3 7.3  16.4 
d) Banking capital  9.7  –22.2 36.0  5.9  4.6 10.9 
of which        
NRI deposits  21.8  26.2 21.8 11.9  8.7  0.2 
e) Rupee debt service  –16.9 –7.0 –2.2 –2.4 –0.4 –0.1 
3. Other capital
2  27.4 3.3  10.2  –3.2  14.2 8.9 
Total (1 + 2 + 3)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
P = provisional. 
1  Medium- and long-term borrowings.    
2  Includes leads and lags in exports (difference between the custom 
and the banking channel data), Indian investment abroad and India's subscription to international institutions 
and quotas. 
Source: Annual Report, Reserve Bank of India, 2006/07. 
 
Non-debt flows 
Equity flows under foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investments constitute 
the major forms of non-debt-creating capital flows to India. There has been a marked 
increase in the magnitude of FDI inflows to India since the early 1990s, reflecting the liberal 
policy regime and growing investor confidence. India’s share in global FDI flows increased 
from 2.3% in 2005 to 4.5% in 2006. Inflows under FDI were particularly high during the last 
two years, though a large part was offset by significant outflows on account of overseas 
investment by Indian corporates.  
In a major break from the past, the spurt in FDI flows to India in the recent period has been 
accompanied by a jump in outward equity investment as Indian firms establish production, 
marketing and distribution networks overseas to achieve global scale along with access to 
new technology and natural resources. Investment in joint ventures (JV) and wholly owned 
subsidiaries (WOS) abroad has emerged as an important vehicle for facilitating global 
expansion by Indian companies. Overseas direct equity investment from India jumped from 
$3.8 billion in 2005/06 to $11.3 billion in 2006/07, and rose further to $12.5 billion during 
2007/08. Overseas investment, which started with the acquisition of foreign companies in the 
IT and related services sector, has now spread to other areas such as non-financial services.  240  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
A marked feature of FDI flows to India is that they have been concentrated in the services 
sector, in contrast to the dominance of manufacturing in the East Asian economies. This 
reflects the service-led growth of the economy and its comparative advantage in international 
trade in services. It may be mentioned that IT has enabled greater tradability of a number of 
business and professional services. With greater potential for growth in such services, FDI 
has also emerged as a vehicle to delivery of services to the international markets. Moreover, 
within the services sector, financing, insurance, real estate and business services witnessed 
a large increase in their share in FDI flows to India between 2002/03 and 2007/08. Computer 
services also remains a key sector for FDI as captive BPO/subsidiaries have been principal 
instruments for facilitating offshore delivery of computer services and IT enabled services.  
Like FDI, India’s share in net portfolio flows to emerging market and developing countries 
has expanded. India has witnessed a dominance of portfolio flows over FDI flows during 
various periods of time, which is in contrast to developing and emerging market economies in 
most parts of the world, where FDI constituted the main source of equity flows (Graph 2). 
However, unlike FDI flows, which have exhibited a more or less steady upward trend over 
the years, portfolio flows are more volatile, moving in tandem with domestic and international 
market sentiments. Accordingly, a sharp rise in portfolio investment into India in the recent 
period reflects both global and domestic factors. The search for yield in view of very low real 
long-term rates in advanced economies has been an important factor driving portfolio flows 
to EMEs as a group, and India also has attracted such flows. Domestic factors, such as 
strong macroeconomic fundamentals, a resilient financial sector, a deep and liquid capital 
market, the improved financial performance of the corporate sector and attractive valuations 
also attracted large portfolio flows. Consistent with the principle of the hierarchy of capital 
flows, India has been making efforts towards encouraging more inflows through FDI and 
enhancing the quality of portfolio flows by strict adherence to the “know your investor” 
principle (Reddy (2005)). 
Graph 2 
Foreign investment inflows to India 
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External assistance, external commercial borrowings (ECBs), trade credits and the non-
repatriable component of NRI deposits constitute the major portion of the external debt in 
India.  
External assistance, which consists of external aid flows from bilateral and multilateral 
sources, constituted the major source of external financing for India in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Its importance has declined steadily during the last three decades as it gave way to private 
capital flows, with the share in India’s total capital flows falling from 31.2% in 1990/91 to 
1.9% in 2007/08. Conversely, India has started extending assistance to other countries, 
mainly grants and loans for technical cooperation and training. The grant component 
dominates external aid with a share of over 90%; the major beneficiaries during 2006/07 
were Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka.  
The recourse to ECBs by Indian corporates, though initiated in the early 1970s, remained 
modest due to the dominance of concessional, non-market-based finance in the form of 
external assistance from bilateral sources and multilateral agencies. Towards the end of the 
1970s, the concessionality in the aid flows dwindled. Thus, with the rising external financing 
requirements beginning in the 1980s and the recognition that reliance on external assistance 
was not favourable, commercial borrowings from international capital markets were 
preferred. After experiencing some slowdown in the aftermath of the balance of payments 
crisis, ECBs rose significantly in the latter half of the 1990s, responding to the strong 
domestic investment demand, favourable global liquidity conditions, the upgrade of India’s 
sovereign credit rating, lower risk premia on emerging market bonds, and an upward phase 
of the capital flow cycle to the EMEs. During this period, ECBs constituted about 30% of the 
net capital flows to India. In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the demand for ECBs 
remained subdued due to a host of factors such as the global economic slowdown, the 
downturn in capital flows to developing countries and lower domestic investment demand. 
The period beginning 2003/04 marked the resumption of debt flows to developing countries, 
the combined outcome of the higher interest rate differential emanating from ample global 
liquidity and the robust growth expectations and low risk perception towards the emerging 
markets. Net inflows under ECBs increased from $2.5 billion in 2005/06 to $16.2 billion in 
2006/07 and further to $22.2 billion during 2007/08. ECBs contributed to about 20.5% of the 
net capital flows to India in 2007/08. Higher ECB drawals during the past few years reflect 
sustained domestic investment demand, import demand, the hardening of domestic interest 
rates and also the greater risk appetite of global investors for emerging market bonds. The 
policy on ECBs is kept under constant review and changes are made as needed.  
In the 1970s, the two oil shocks shifted substantial resources towards oil-exporting countries, 
which provided investment and employment opportunities in the oil-rich countries. The 
Reserve Bank devised specific deposit schemes to tap the savings of NRIs employed in 
these countries. Non-Resident Indians/Overseas Corporate Bodies were allowed to open 
and maintain bank accounts in India under special deposit schemes, both rupee- and foreign 
currency denominated. NRI deposits were a generally stable source of support to India’s 
balance of payments through the 1990s, although the external payment difficulties of 
1990/91 demonstrated the vulnerability that can be associated with these deposits in times of 
difficulty and drastic changes in perceptions. Since the 1990s, the Reserve Bank has aligned 
the interest rates on these deposits with international rates and fine-tuned the reserve 
requirements, end use specifications and other concomitant factors influencing these 
deposits in order to modulate these flows consistent with overall macroeconomic 
management.  
As a whole, India’s external debt stock stood at $221.2 billion at the end of March 2008. 
Consolidation of India’s external debt position is reflected the steady improvement in India’s 
debt sustainability and liquidity indicators. While the ratio of India’s external debt to GDP has 
declined over the years from 38.7% in 1991/92 to 18.8% in 2007/08, the debt service ratio 242  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
declined from 30.2% to 5.4% during the same period (Graph 3). At the end of March 2008, 
India’s foreign exchange reserves, at $309.7 billion, provided a cover of 140% to total 
external debt, though there has been a increase in the short-term debt in recent years. As 
regards the composition of external debt, there has been a distinct decline in the share of 
government debt in total external debt, which fell from 43.4% to 26.3% of total external debt 
between end-March 2001 and end-December 2007, giving way to non-government private 
external borrowings (Graph 4).  
Graph 3 
External debt indicators 
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Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
Graph 4 
Government and private external debt outstanding 
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On account of large capital inflows, India’s international investment position (IIP) has 
deteriorated over the years. Net international liabilities increased from $47.2 billion at 
end-March 2004 to $73.9 billion at end-December 2007, as the increase in international 
liabilities ($222.5 billion) exceeded the increase in international assets ($195.7 billion) during 
the period (Graph 5). While the increase in the liabilities was mainly due to large capital flows 
under portfolio investment, FDI and external commercial loans, the increase in international 
assets mainly reflected a rise in reserve assets, followed by direct investment abroad. A 
major part of the liabilities, such as direct and portfolio investment, reflects cumulative 
inflows, which are provided at historical prices. The value of the liabilities would be much 
higher if marked to market at current prices. The ratio of non-debt liabilities to total external 
financial liabilities has witnessed an increasing trend since end-June 2006, rising from 42.3% 
at end-June 2006 to 50.8% at end-December 2007 due to large capital inflows under direct 
and portfolio equity investments. On the other hand, debt liabilities, which include portfolio 
investment in debt securities and other investment (trade credits, loans, currency and 
deposits and other liabilities) declined from 57.7% to 49.2% during the same period. 
Graph 5 
India’s external liabilities 
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Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
III. Management  of  capital flows in India 
The recent episode of capital flows, which has occurred against the backdrop of current 
account surpluses in most of the emerging Asian economies, highlights the importance of the 
absorption of capital flows. A large surge in capital flows over a short span of time in excess 
of domestic absorptive capacity can lead to upward pressure on the exchange rate, possible 
overheating of the economy and asset price bubbles. It can also pose the risk of an abrupt 
reversal, which may have potential negative real economic effects. The absorption of capital 
flows is limited by the size of the current account deficit, which has traditionally been low in 244  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
India, and seldom above 2% of GDP. Given this situation, large capital inflows are a stress 
on the real economy through exchange rate appreciation and sterilisation. This not only 
affects exporters, but also affects the profitability of domestic producers through pressures 
on domestic prices, unless productivity goes up commensurately. Real appreciation of the 
exchange rate leading to a widening of the trade deficit could also result in a slowdown in 
economic and industrial growth. Thus, the combination of low domestic absorption and high 
capital inflows has posed new challenges for monetary and exchange rate management in 
India.  
In the medium term, a continued focus on financial market development would mitigate the 
challenge of capital flows. However, it is important to recognise that maturation of financial 
markets takes time. Hence, capital flows have to be managed through other tools in the short 
term, while continuing work on the development of financial markets (Reddy (2008a)). In 
response to net capital flows remaining well in excess of the current account financing need, 
a multi-pronged approach has been followed in India to deal with such flows. The policy 
responses have included, inter alia, phased liberalisation of the policy framework in relation 
to current as well as capital account outflows; foreign exchange market intervention and 
subsequent sterilisation; lowering interest rate ceilings on NRI deposits; management of 
external debt through prepayment and moderation in the access of corporates and 
intermediaries to additional external debt; and greater flexibility in exchange rate movements. 
III.1  Capital flows and exchange rate management 
In India, with the gradual removal of restrictions on international capital flows and greater 
integration of domestic with global financial markets, understanding the precise nature of the 
causal relationship among capital flows, the exchange rate, interest rates and reactions of 
monetary policy has certainly become more complex. The response lag of the exchange rate 
and domestic liquidity to monetary policy actions in the form of direct intervention in the 
exchange market as well as changes in the short-term policy rates has important implications 
for the stability of foreign exchange markets and external price competitiveness. The 
importance of capital flows in determining exchange rate movements has increased 
considerably, rendering some of the earlier guideposts of monetary policy formulation 
possibly anachronistic (Mohan (2007a)). On a day-to-day basis, it is capital flows which 
influence the exchange rate and interest rate arithmetic of the financial markets. Instead of 
the real factors underlying trade competitiveness, it is expectations and reactions to news 
which drive capital flows and exchange rates, often out of alignment with fundamentals. 
Capital flows have been observed to cause overshooting of exchange rates as market 
participants act in concert while pricing information. In the Indian case, notwithstanding the 
persistence of a large trade deficit, capital flows have led to appreciation of the exchange 
rate, indicating the dominance of capital inflows in determining exchange rate movements 
(Graph 6).  
The experience with capital flows has important lessons for the choice of the exchange rate 
regime. The advocacy of corner solutions – a fixed peg without monetary policy 
independence or a freely floating exchange rate retaining discretionary conduct of monetary 
policy – is distinctly on the decline. The weight of experience seems to be tilting in favour of 
intermediate regimes with country-specific features, without targets for the level of the 
exchange rate and exchange market interventions to fight extreme market turbulence. In 
general, EMEs have accumulated massive foreign exchange reserves as a circuit breaker for 
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Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
In India, since a market-determined exchange rate system was set in place in March 1993, 
the exchange rate has been largely determined by demand and supply conditions in the 
market. The exchange rate policy in recent years has been guided by the broad principles of 
careful monitoring and management of exchange rates with flexibility, without a fixed target 
or a preannounced target or band, while allowing the underlying demand and supply 
conditions to determine the exchange rate movements over a period in an orderly way. 
Subject to this predominant objective, the exchange rate policy is guided by the need to 
reduce excess volatility, prevent the emergence of destabilising speculative activities, 
maintain an adequate level of reserves and develop an orderly foreign exchange market. The 
Indian foreign exchange market, like other developing country markets, is not yet very deep 
and broad, and can sometimes be characterised by an uneven flow of demand and supply 
over different periods. In this situation, the Reserve Bank has been prepared to make sales 
and purchases of foreign currency in order to even out lumpy demand and supply in the 
relatively thin forex market and to smooth jerky movements. However, such intervention is 
not governed by a predetermined target or band around the exchange rate.  
Over the years, transactions in the Indian foreign exchange market have experienced 
tremendous growth. The increase in foreign exchange market turnover in India between April 
2004 and April 2007 was the highest amongst the 54 countries covered in the Triennial 
Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity conducted by the 
BIS in 2007. According to the survey, the daily average turnover in India jumped almost 
fivefold from $7 billion in April 2004 to $34 billion in April 2007, whereas global turnover over 
the same period increased by only 69%, from $1.9 trillion to $3.2 trillion. Reflecting these 
trends, the share of India in global foreign exchange market turnover trebled from 0.3% in 
April 2004 to 0.9% in April 2007. The average daily turnover in Indian foreign exchange 
market almost doubled from $25.8 billion in 2006/07 to $48.0 billion in 2007/08 (Table 3). 246  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
Component-wise, the share of the spot market in total foreign exchange market turnover has 
declined marginally in recent years due to a pickup in turnover in the derivatives segment. 
The merchant segment of the spot market is generally dominated by the Government of 
India, select public sector units, such as Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), and the FIIs. As the 
foreign exchange demand from public sector units and FIIs tends to be lumpy and uneven, 
resultant demand-supply mismatches entail occasional pressures on the foreign exchange 
market, warranting market interventions by the Reserve Bank. However, as noted earlier, such 
intervention is not governed by a predetermined target or band around the exchange rate.  
Table 3 
Average daily volume of transactions in the Indian forex market 
In billions of US dollars 
Year Spot  Derivatives
1  Total 
1997/98 2.6  2.4  5.0 
2000/01 2.8  3.0  5.8 
2003/04 4.3  4.4  8.7 
2004/05 5.8  5.8  11.6 
2005/06 8.9  8.7  17.6 
2006/07 13.4  12.4  25.8 
2007/08 23.8  24.2  48.0 
1  Includes swap and forward transactions. 
Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
The public sector oil companies are among the important participants in the financial markets 
in India. Therefore, the liquidity and other related issues currently faced by these entities 
arising from the unprecedented escalation in international crude prices have systemic 
implications for the smooth functioning of financial markets and for overall financial stability in 
India. Accordingly, in order to minimise the potential adverse consequences for financial 
markets, the Reserve Bank has since end-May 2008 put in place Special Market Operations 
(SMOs) under which it (i) conducts open market operations (outright or repo at the discretion 
of the Reserve Bank) in the secondary market through designated banks in oil bonds held by 
public sector oil marketing companies in their own accounts, currently subject to an overall 
ceiling of Rs. 15 billion on any single day; and (ii) provides equivalent foreign exchange 
through designated banks at market exchange rates to the oil companies. The SMOs 
constitute only a fraction of the total turnover in the money and foreign exchange markets in 
India but are designed to reduce volatility. Further, the SMOs are likely to improve the access 
of public sector oil companies to domestic liquidity and alleviate the lumpy demand in the 
foreign exchange market in the current extraordinary situation.  
Despite interventions by the Reserve Bank in the face of large capital flows, the exchange 
rate in the recent period has been marked by significant bidirectional movement, implying 
greater flexibility (Table 4). The IMF has observed in its Article IV Consultation Paper: “since 
the start of 2007, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) have experienced significant 
REER appreciation. Most of the real appreciation in 2007 for India and Brazil came from 
nominal appreciation, whereas China and Russia had inflation-led appreciation”. Moreover, the 
volatility of the rupee exchange rate has become quite similar to the volatilities of exchange 




Exchange rate movements 
In rupees per US dollar 
Year Range  Average  Standard  deviation 
1993/94 31.21/31.49  31.37  0.05 
1994/95 31.37–31.97  31.40  0.12 
1995/96 31.37–37.95  33.45  0.56 
1996/97 34.14–35.96  35.50  0.21 
1997/98 35.70–40.36  37.16  0.37 
1998/99 39.48–43.42  42.07  0.24 
1999/00 42.44–43.64  43.33  0.10 
2000/01 43.61–46.89  45.68  0.15 
2001/02 46.56–48.85  47.69  0.13 
2002/03 47.51–49.06  48.40  0.07 
2003/04 43.45–47.46  45.92  0.19 
2004/05 43.36–46.46  44.95  0.31 
2005/06 43.30–46.33  44.28  0.22 
2006/07 43.14–46.97  45.28  0.27 
2007/08 39.26–43.15  40.24  0.38 
Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
III.2  Capital flows and monetary management 
Capital flows and liquidity management 
In the recent period, in India, one of the most serious challenges to the conduct of monetary 
policy emerges from capital flows in view of their significantly higher volatility as well as the 
fact that capital flows in gross terms are much higher than those in net terms. Swings in 
capital flows can have a significant impact on exchange rates, domestic monetary and 
liquidity conditions and overall macroeconomic and financial stability (Mohan (2007a)). This 
has warranted appropriate monetary operations to obviate wide fluctuations in market rates 
and ensure reasonable stability consistent with the monetary policy stance. In fact, the Indian 
experience illustrates the tight link between external sector management and domestic 
monetary management (Mohan (2006)). 
With a view to neutralising the impact of excess forex flows on account of a large capital 
account surplus, the Reserve Bank has intervened in the foreign exchange market at regular 
intervals. But unsterilised forex market intervention can result in inflation, a loss of 
competitiveness and attenuation of monetary control. The loss of monetary control could be 
steep if such flows are large. Therefore, it is essential that the monetary authorities take 
measures to offset the impact of such foreign exchange market intervention, partly or wholly, 
so as to retain the efficacy of monetary policy through such intervention. Most techniques to 
offset the impact of forex inflows can be classified as either market-based or non-market-
based. The market-based approach involves financial transactions between the central bank 
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non-market-based approach involves the use of quantitative barriers, rules or restrictions on 
market activity, which attempt to keep the potential injection of liquidity outside the domestic 
financial system. The market-based approach aimed at neutralising part or whole of the 
monetary impact of foreign inflows is termed sterilisation. 
In India, the liquidity impact of large capital inflows was traditionally managed mainly through 
the repo and reverse repo auctions under the day-to-day Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF). 
The LAF operations were supplemented by outright open market operations (OMOs), 
ie outright sales of the government securities, to absorb liquidity on an enduring basis. In 
addition to the LAF and OMOs, excess liquidity from the financial system was also absorbed 
through the building-up of surplus balances of the government with the Reserve Bank, 




Introduction of MSS 
In view of the finite stock of government securities available with the Reserve Bank for sterilisation, 
particularly as the option of issuing central bank securities is not permissible under the RBI Act, the 
Working Group on Instruments of Sterilisation (2004) recommended that the central government 
issue a special variety of bills/bonds for sterilisation purposes. Unlike in the case of central bank 
securities, where the cost of sterilisation is borne indirectly by the fisc, the cost of issuance of such 
instruments by the government would be directly and transparently borne by the fisc. The 
Committee recommended that to operationalise such a new instrument of sterilisation and ensure 
fiscal transparency, the central government consider setting up a Market Stabilisation Fund (MSF) 
to be created in the Public Account. This Fund could issue new instruments called Market 
Stabilisation Bills/Bonds (MSBs) for mopping up enduring surplus liquidity from the system over and 
above the amount that could be absorbed under the day-to-day repo operations of the LAF. 
Based on the above recommendation, a new instrument named the Market Stabilisation Scheme 
(MSS) has been made operational from April 2004. Under this scheme, which is meant exclusively 
for sterilisation purposes, the Reserve Bank has been empowered to issue government Treasury 
bills and medium-duration dated securities for the purpose of liquidity absorption. The scheme 
works by impounding the proceeds of auctions of Treasury bill and government securities in a 
separate identifiable MSS cash account maintained and operated by the RBI. The amounts credited 
into the MSS cash account are appropriated only for the purpose of redemption and/or buyback of 
the Treasury bills and/or dated securities issued under the MSS. MSS securities are 
indistinguishable from normal Treasury bills and government dated securities in the hands of the 
lender. The payments for interest and discount on MSS securities are not made from the MSS 
account, but shown in the Union budget and other related documents transparently as distinct 
components under separate subheads. The introduction of MSS has succeeded broadly in restoring 
the LAF to its intended function of daily liquidity management.  
Since its introduction in April 2004, the MSS has served as a very useful instrument for medium-
term monetary and liquidity management. It has been unwound at times of low capital flows and 
built up when excess capital flows could lead to excess domestic liquidity (Mohan (2006)). 
MSS balances 
In billions of rupees 
  2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
Interest payments  20.6 34.2 26.1 83.5 
Outstanding amount  642.1 290.6 629.7  1,683.9 
MSS outstanding balance as of 11 July 2008 was Rs. 1,714.8 billion. 
Source: Union Finance Accounts; Union Budget Documents; Reserve Bank of India. 
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The market-based operations led to a progressive reduction in the quantum of securities with 
the Reserve Bank. This apart, as per those operations, the usage of the entire stock of 
securities for outright open market sales was constrained by the allocation of a part of the 
securities for day-to-day LAF operations as well as for investments of surplus balances of the 
central government, besides investments by the state governments in respect of earmarked 
funds (CSF/GRF) while some of the government securities were also in non-marketable lots. 
In the face of large capital flows coupled with a declining stock of government securities, the 
Reserve Bank introduced a new instrument of sterilisation, the Market Stabilisation Scheme 
(MSS) to sustain market operations (Box 1). Since its introduction in April 2004, the MSS has 
served as a very useful instrument for medium-term monetary and liquidity management. 
In addition to various market-based instruments of sterilisation, such as the LAF, OMOs, the 
MSS, balances of the Government of India with the Reserve Bank, forex swaps and private 
placements for prepayment of external loans, the RBI has also had recourse to increasing 
the cash reserve ratio for banks to withdraw excess liquidity from the system. In recognition 
of the cumulative and lagged effects of monetary policy, pre-emptive monetary tightening 
measures have also been put in effect since September 2004 and continued during 2006/07, 
2007/08 and 2008/09, in part to manage monetary effects of excess capital flows. Since 
September 2004, the repo rate and the reverse repo rate have been increased by 250 and 
150 basis points, respectively, while the cash reserve ratio (CRR) has been raised by 
400  basis points. In the context of large capital inflows and implications for liquidity and 
monetary management, the interest rate ceilings on various non-resident deposit schemes 
have been reduced by 75–100 basis points since January 2007 to discourage greater inflows 
into these accounts.  
Cost of sterilisation 
In the choice of instruments for sterilisation, it is important to recognise the benefits and costs 
of sterilisation in general and the relative costs/benefits in the usage of a particular 
instrument. The various instruments differ in their impact on the balance sheets of the central 
bank, the government and the financial sector. For example, in the case of OMO sales, the 
differential between the yield on government securities and return on foreign exchange 
assets is the cost to the Reserve Bank. Sales of government securities under OMOs also 
involve a transfer of market risks to the financial intermediaries, mostly banks. The repo 
operations under the LAF have a direct cost to the Reserve Bank. In the context of an 
increase in the CRR, the cost is borne by the banking sector if CRR balances are not 
remunerated. However, if they are, the cost could be shared between the banking sector and 
the Reserve Bank. The extent of capital flows to be sterilised and the choice of instruments 
thus also depend upon the impact on the balance sheets of these entities. 
The cost of sterilisation in India is shared by the central government (the cost of the MSS), the 
Reserve Bank (sterilisation under the LAF) and the banking system (in the case of an 
increase in the reserve requirements). Since surpluses of the Reserve Bank are transferred to 
the central government, on a combined balance sheet basis, the relative burdens of cost 
between the government and Reserve Bank are not of great relevance. However, the direct 
cost borne by the government is transparently shown in its budget accounts. Owing to the 
difference between international and Indian interest rates, there is a positive cost of 
sterilisation, but the cost has to be traded off against the benefits associated with market 
stability, export competitiveness and possible crisis avoidance in the external sector. Sterilised 
interventions and interest rate policy are generally consistent with the overall monetary policy 
stance that is primarily framed on the basis of the domestic macroeconomic outlook. 
III.3  Capital account liberalisation 
It is interesting to note that a number of empirical studies do not find evidence that greater 
openness and higher capital flows lead to higher growth (eg Prasad et al (2007)). These 
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among non-industrial countries, implying that a reduced reliance on foreign capital is 
associated with higher growth. Alternative specifications do not find any evidence of an 
increase in foreign capital inflows directly boosting growth. The results could be attributable 
to the fact that even successful developing countries have limited absorptive capacity for 
foreign resources, either because their financial markets are underdeveloped, or because 
their economies are prone to overvaluation caused by rapid capital inflows. Thus, a cautious 
approach to capital account liberalisation would be useful for macroeconomic and financial 
stability (Mohan (2008)). 
Henry (2007) argues that the empirical methodology of most of the existing studies is flawed 
since they attempt to look for permanent effects of capital account liberalisation on growth, 
whereas the theory posits only a temporary impact on the growth rate. Once such a 
distinction is recognised, empirical evidence suggests that opening the capital account within 
a given country consistently generates economically large and statistically significant effects, 
not only on economic growth, but also on the cost of capital and investment. The beneficial 
impact is, however, dependent upon the approach to the opening of the capital account, in 
particular the policies in regard to liberalisation of debt and equity flows. Recent research 
demonstrates that liberalisation of debt flows – particularly short-term, dollar-denominated 
debt flows – may cause problems. On the other hand, the evidence indicates that countries 
derive substantial benefits from opening their equity markets to foreign investors. 
India has cautiously opened up its capital account since the early 1990s as policymakers 
realised that to meet the country’s huge investment needs domestic savings needed to be 
supplemented with foreign savings. However, in liberalising its capital account, India has 
adopted a discriminatory approach towards various forms of capital flows. The Ministry of 
Finance, in its review of the trends in receipts and expenditures at the end of the second 
quarter of the financial year 2007/08, mentioned that FDI is the most preferred form of 
foreign capital flow. Investments in Indian firms through the stock market and by venture 
capital firms in unlisted companies are also potentially beneficial. External commercial 
borrowings and other short-term flows are areas where one can introduce an element of 
control to moderate sudden surges. Accordingly, the thrust of policy reform in India was in 
favour of a compositional shift in capital flows away from debt to non-debt-creating flows, 
viz FDI and foreign portfolio investment; strict regulation of ECBs, especially short-term debt; 
discouraging the volatile element of flows from NRIs; and gradual liberalisation of outflows. 
The present status of the various policy measures taken in India to manage the capital 
account is given at Annexes 1A and 1B. 
India has followed a gradualist approach to liberalisation of its capital account. The status of 
capital account convertibility in India for various non-residents is as follows: for foreign 
corporate and financial institutions, there is a substantial degree of convertibility; for (NRIs) 
there is an approximately equal degree of convertibility, but accompanied by some 
procedural and regulatory impediments. For non-resident individuals other than NRIs there is 
near-zero convertibility. Movement towards fuller capital account convertibility (FCAC) 
implies that all non-residents (corporate and individuals) should be treated equally. As 
mentioned earlier, recognising the merits in moving towards fuller capital account 
convertibility, the Reserve Bank, in consultation with the government, appointed the 
Committee on Fuller Capital Account Convertibility in March 2006. The Committee has set 
out the preconditions for moving towards FCAC. The Committee has made several 
recommendations on the development of financial markets in addition to addressing issues 
related to interaction of monetary policy and exchange rate management, 
regulation/supervision of banks and the timing and sequencing of capital account 
liberalisation measures. Measures towards FCAC as recommended by the Committee are 
provided at Annex 2.  
Accordingly, the Reserve Bank has implemented a number of measures, eg raising the limit 
on remittances, liberalisation of Exchange Earners' Foreign Currency Accounts, liberalisation 
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borrowings, increasing the access to ECBs, establishment of corporate offices abroad, 
allowing increased FII investment in government securities, raising the ceiling on mutual 
funds’ overseas investment, and liberalisation of forward contract regulations, etc based on 
the recommendations made by the Committee.   
In view of the large capital flows during the last few years, the government and the Reserve 
Bank have recently taken some additional capital account measures aimed at limiting the 
implications of forex flows for the conduct of domestic monetary policy. In February 2003, the 
government prepaid part of its high-cost external debt amounting to $3.03 billion to the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank by privately placing marketable securities with the 
Reserve Bank. This apart, relaxations were effected in regard to outflows, under both the 
current and capital accounts (Box 2). At the same time measures were taken to manage debt 
inflows, especially ECBs and NRI deposits.  
Box 2 
Recent measures towards liberalisation  
of capital outflows from India 
•  Investments in overseas joint ventures (JV) / wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS) by Indian 
companies have been permitted up to 400% of the net worth of the Indian company under 
the Automatic Route. 
•  Indian companies have been allowed to invest in energy and natural resources sectors 
such as oil, gas, coal and mineral ores in excess of the current limits with the prior 
approval of the Reserve Bank. 
•  Listed Indian companies have been allowed to undertake portfolio investment abroad up 
to 50% of the net worth (up from the earlier limit of 35%). 
•  The earlier limit for prepayment of ECBs without Reserve Bank approval has been 
increased from $400 million to $500 million, subject to compliance with the minimum 
average maturity period as applicable to the loan. 
•  The aggregate ceiling for overseas investments by mutual funds registered with SEBI has 
been increased from $5 billion to $7 billion. 
•  The earlier limit under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) has been raised from 
$100,000 to $200,000 per financial year. 
 
In addition, changes in policies are made from time to time to modulate debt-creating capital 
flows depending on the financing needs of the corporate sector and the vulnerability of the 
domestic economy to external shocks. Recently, to facilitate easy access by Indian 
corporates to foreign funds, the Reserve Bank has increased the limit on ECBs for rupee 
expenditure for permissible end uses under the Approval Route to $100 million for borrowers 
in the infrastructure sector and $50 million for other borrowers from the earlier limit of 
$20  million per financial year, with effect from 29 May 2008. The all-in-cost interest rate 
ceiling for ECBs and trade credits for imports into India have been raised. Effective 2 June 
2008, entities in the services sector, viz hotels, hospitals and software companies, are 
allowed to avail themselves of ECBs up to $100 million per financial year, for the purpose of 
importing capital goods under the Approval Route. The limits on FII investment in the Indian 
debt market have been revised upwards from $4.7 billion ($3.2 billion in government 
securities and $1.5 billion in corporate bonds) to $8.0 billion ($5.0 billion and $3.0 billion 
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IV. Issues  and  challenges 
The management of capital flows is a complex process encompassing a spectrum of policy 
choices, which inter alia include the appropriate level of reserves, monetary policy objectives 
related to liquidity management, and the maintenance of healthy financial market conditions 
with financial stability. The intensified pressures due to large and volatile capital flows in the 
recent period in an atmosphere of global uncertainties make the task significantly more 
complex and critical (Reddy (2008b)). India’s Finance Minister, referring to “Managing Capital 
Flows” in the Mid-Year Review of 2007/08 dated 7 December 2007 stated that: “While there 
are international experiences in this regard with some successful and painful adjustment 
process, the specific Indian context requires innovative policy responses. Going forward, this 
would be a major challenge”.  
In view of the above, some of the major issues as well as emerging challenges in respect of 
management of capital flows to India include the following: 
•  In the face of large and volatile capital flows, the problem for monetary management 
is twofold. First, it has to distinguish implicitly between durable flows and transient 
flows. If capital flows are deemed to be durable and indefinite, questions arise 
regarding foreign exchange management. If the flows are deemed to be semi-
durable, essentially reflecting the business cycle, the task of monetary and liquidity 
management is to smooth out their impact on the domestic economy, finding means 
to absorb liquidity in times of surplus and to inject it in times of deficit. Second, in the 
short term, daily, weekly or monthly volatility in flows needs to be smoothed to 
minimise the effect on domestic overnight interest rates. In practice, ex ante, it is 
difficult to distinguish what is durable, what is semi-durable and what is transient. 
Hence policy and practice effectively operate in an environment of uncertainty and a 
variety of instruments have to be used to manage liquidity in this fluid scenario. 
•  The challenges for monetary policy with an open capital account are exacerbated if 
domestic inflation rises. In the event of demand pressures building up, increases in 
interest rates might be advocated to sustain growth in a non-inflationary manner, but 
such action increases the possibility of further capital inflows if a significant part of 
these flows is interest sensitive and explicit policies to moderate flows are not 
undertaken. These flows could potentially reduce the efficacy of monetary policy 
tightening by enhancing liquidity. Such dilemmas complicate the conduct of 
monetary policy in India if inflation exceeds the indicative projections. During 
2006/07, 2007/08 and 2008/09 so far, as domestic interest rates in India hardened 
on the back of withdrawal of monetary accommodation, external foreign currency 
borrowings by domestic corporates witnessed a significant jump, leading to even 
higher flows. Where there are no restrictions on overseas borrowings by banks and 
financial institutions, such entities could also annul the efforts of domestic monetary 
tightening.  
•  As far as the exchange rate is concerned, the large inflow of remittances and major 
and sustained growth in software exports coupled with capital inflows have the 
potential for possible overvaluation of the currency and the resultant erosion of long-
term competitiveness of other traditional and goods sectors – a problem popularly 
known as Dutch disease. Given the fact that more people are in the goods sector, 
the human aspects of exchange rate management should not be lost sight of. The 
Dutch disease syndrome has so far been managed by way of reserves build-up and 
sterilisation, the former preventing excessive nominal appreciation and the latter 
preventing higher inflation. However, the issue remains how long and to what extent 
such an exchange rate management strategy would work given the fact that India is 
faced with large and continuing capital flows apart from strengthening current 
receipts on account of remittances and software exports. This issue has assumed 
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higher sustained growth performance and significant enhancement of international 
confidence in the Indian economy (Mohan (2007a)). 
•  A related issue is whether there should be sterilised intervention and if so, the timing 
and quantum of such interventions. There is usually a cost attached to sterilisation 
operations. At the same time, it is also necessary to assess the indirect cost of not 
sterilising if there are signs of a Dutch disease caused by flows in the capital 
account. Most often, it is not a question of whether to sterilise or not, but how much 
to sterilise. That is an important issue of judgment that needs to be made in 
conjunction with domestic monetary and liquidity conditions. 
•  Even when capital flows are sterilised through open market operations, the costs 
could be large when sterilisation operations raise domestic interest rates and result 
in the trap of even greater capital flows. The fiscal impact of sterilisation also needs 
to be factored in, especially when a large stock of securities has to be issued for the 
purpose. 
•  Another issue relates to the choice and an appropriate mix of instruments for 
sterilisation. Each of the instruments (MSS, LAF and CRR) has different features 
and interactions. Utilisation of each of these will also depend on the permanency of 
the components of the flows and how they should be sterilised in the aggregate. 
Further, each instrument can be used in different ways. The LAF is able to take care 
of very short-period flows. The MSS handles the longer-term flows slightly better 
than the LAF, and the CRR is more appropriate for addressing fairly long-term flows. 
However, the effectiveness of the MSS will depend more on the initiatives of the 
market participants than on the decisions of the Reserve Bank. Operationally, the 
issue is often not which instrument but how much each instrument needs to be 
utilised, with due regard to the capital flows, market conditions and monetary as well 
as credit developments.  
•  While interventions are carried out with the objective of containing volatility in the 
forex market, intervention over a long period, especially when the exchange rate is 
moving in one direction, could make interventions less effective. However, a critical 
question is what would be the impact on expectations about future movements in 
forex markets if no intervention takes place. The challenges of intervention and 
management of expectations will be particularly daunting when financial contagion 
occurs, since such events are characterised by suddenness, high speed and large 
magnitudes of unexpected flows, in either direction. The quintessence for a relevant 
monetary policy is the speed of adjustment of the policy measures to rapidly 
changing situations. 
•  A further challenge for policy in the context of fuller capital account openness will be 
to preserve the financial stability of the system as further deregulation of capital 
outflows and debt inflows proceeds. This will require market development, 
enhancement of regulatory capacity in these areas, as well as human resource 
development in both financial intermediaries and non-financial entities. 
•  Another aspect of greater capital market openness concerns the presence of foreign 
banks in India. With fuller capital account convertibility and a greater presence of 
foreign banks over time, a number of issues will arise. First, if these large global 
banks have emerged as a result of real economies of scale and scope, how will 
smaller national banks compete in countries like India, and will they themselves 
need to generate a larger international presence? Second, there is considerable 
discussion today on overlaps and potential conflicts between home country 
regulators of foreign banks and host country regulators: how will these be addressed 
and resolved in the years to come? Third, given that operations in one country such 
as India are typically small relative to the global operations of these large banks, the 
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Consequently, any market or regulatory transgressions committed in one country by 
such a bank, which may have a significant impact on the banking or financial market 
of that country, are likely to have a negligible impact on the bank's global operations. 
It has been seen in recent years that even relatively strong regulatory action taken 
by regulators against such global banks has had a negligible market or reputational 
impact on them in terms of their stock price or similar metrics. Thus, there is a loss 
of regulatory effectiveness as a result of the presence of such financial 
conglomerates. Hence, there is inevitably a tension between the benefits that such 
global conglomerates bring and some regulatory and market structure and 
competition issues that may arise. 
V. Outlook 
Recent global developments have considerably heightened the uncertainty surrounding the 
outlook for capital flows to India, complicating the conduct of monetary policy and liquidity 
management. In view of the strong fundamentals of the economy and massive injections of 
liquidity by central banks in advanced economies, there could be sustained inflows, as in the 
recent past. If the pressures intensify, it may necessitate stepped-up operations in terms of 
capital account management and more active liquidity management with all instruments at 
the command of the Reserve Bank. At the same time, it is necessary in the context of recent 
global events not to exclude the possibility of reversals of capital flows due to abrupt changes 
in sentiment or global liquidity conditions. In this scenario, it is important to be ready to deal 
with potentially large and volatile outflows along with spillovers. In this context, there is room 
for manoeuvre for the Reserve Bank to deal with both scenarios in terms of the flexibility in 
the deployment of instruments such as the MSS, CRR, SLR and LAF for active liquidity 
management in both directions, complemented by prudential regulations and instruments for 




Measures to manage capital inflows  
 Current  regulations 
Foreign direct 
investment 
FDI is permitted under the Automatic Route in items/activities in all 
sectors up to the sectoral caps except in certain sectors where 
investment is prohibited. Investments not permitted under the 
Automatic Route require approval from the Foreign Investment 
Promotion Board (FIPB). The receipt of remittance has to be reported 
to the RBI within 30 days from the date of receipt of funds and the 
issue of shares has to be reported to the RBI within 30 days from the 
date of issue by the investee company. 
Advance against equity   An Indian company issuing shares to a person resident outside India 
can receive such amount in advance. The amount received has to be 
reported within 30 days from the date of receipt of funds There is no 
provision on allotment of shares within a specified time. The banks can 
refund the amount received as advance, provided they are satisfied 
with the bona fides of the applicant and are satisfied that no part of 
remittance represents interest on the funds received. 
Foreign portfolio 
investment: FIIs 
Investment by non-residents is permitted under the Portfolio 
Investment Scheme to entities registered as FIIs and their 
sub-accounts under SEBI (FII) regulations. Investment by individual 
FIIs is subject to a ceiling of 10% of the PUC of the company and 
aggregate FII investment is subject to a limit of 24% of PUC of the 
company. This limit can be increased by the company subject to the 
sectoral limit permitted under the FDI policy.  
The transactions are subject to daily reporting by designated ADs to 
the RBI for the purpose of monitoring adherence to the ceiling for 
aggregate investments.  
Foreign portfolio 
investment: NRIs 
Investment by NRIs under the Portfolio Investment Scheme is 
restricted to 5% by individual NRIs/OCBs and 10% in aggregate (which 
can be increased to 24% by the company concerned).  
Issue of ADRs/GDRs  Indian companies are allowed to raise resources through issue of 
ADRs/GDRs and the eligibility of the issuer company is aligned with 
the requirements under the FDI policy. 
The issue of Sponsored ADRs/GDRs requires prior approval of the 
Ministry of Finance. 
A limited Two-way Fungibility scheme has been put in place by the 
government for ADRs/GDRs. Under this Scheme, a stock broker in 
India registered with SEBI can purchase shares of an Indian company 
from the market for conversion into ADRs/GDRs based on instructions 
received from overseas investors. Reissuance of ADRs/GDRs would 
be permitted to the extent of ADRs/GDRs which have been redeemed 
into underlying shares and sold in the Indian market. 
Investment in mutual 
funds 
FIIs and NRIs are allowed to invest in units of mutual funds without any 
limit. 
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FIIs are eligible to invest in these instruments within an overall limit of 
$5 billion. 
NRIs are allowed to invest in these instruments without any limit (on 
both a repatriation and non-repatriation basis). 
Multilateral institutions which have been allowed to float rupee bonds 
can invest in these instruments. 
Investment in corporate 
debt 
FIIs are permitted to invest in corporate debt within an overall limit of 
$3 billion. 
Investment in 
commercial paper (CP) 
FIIs are allowed to invest in CP subject to the limit applicable to 
corporate debt. 
NRIs are allowed to invest in CP on a non-repatriation basis.  
Investments in Upper 
Tier II instruments by 
Indian banks 
Investment by FIIs in Upper Tier II instruments raised in Indian rupees 
is allowed subject to a separate ceiling of $500 million. 
Investment in other debt 
instruments  
NRIs are allowed to invest in non-convertible debentures floated by 
Indian companies by way of a public issue. There is no limit on 
investment by NRIs in these instruments. 
Foreign venture capital 
investors (FVCIs) 
FVCIs registered with SEBI are allowed to invest in units of venture 
capital funds without any limit. 
FVCI investment in equity of Indian venture capital undertakings is also 
allowed. The limit for such investments would be based on the sectoral 
limits under the FDI policy. 
FVCIs are also allowed to invest in debt instruments floated by the 
IVCUs. There is no separate limit stipulated for investment in such 
instruments by FVCIs.  
External commercial 
borrowings (ECBs) 
Under the Automatic Route, ECBs up to $500 million per borrowing 
company per financial year are permitted only for foreign currency 
expenditure for permissible end uses.  
Borrowers in the infrastructure sector may undertake ECBs up to 
$100 million for rupee expenditure for permissible end uses under the 
Approval Route. In case of other borrowers, the limit for rupee 
expenditure for permissible end uses under the Approval Route has 
been raised to $50 million from the earlier limit of $20 million.  
Entities in the services sector, viz hotels, hospitals and software 
companies, have been allowed to undertake ECB up to $100 million 
per financial year for the purpose of importing capital goods under the 
Approval Route. 
The all-in-cost interest ceiling for borrowings with maturity of three to 
five years has been increased from 150 basis points to 200 basis 
points over six-month Libor. Similarly, the interest ceiling for loans 
maturing after five years has been raised to 350 basis points from 
250 basis points over six-month Libor. 
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  Current regulations (cont) 
Trade credit  Import linked short-term loans (trade credit) up to $20 million per 
import transaction for all permissible imports with a maturity of one 
year is allowed under the Automatic Route. Trade credit up to 
$20 million per import transaction with maturity of less than three years 
is allowed for import of capital goods under the Automatic Route. 
Delayed import 
payments 
In case of delayed import payments due to disputes or financial 
difficulties, ADs can remit the amount subject to an all-in-cost ceiling of 
Libor plus 50 basis points for a period up to one year and Libor plus 
125 basis points for periods of less than three years. However, interest 
payment for delayed payment of trade credit can be made for periods 
of less than three years. 
Export advance  Export advance can be obtained for 12 months. The rate of interest for 
export advance up to one year is Libor plus 100 basis points. 
Bank borrowing 
overseas 
Restricted to 25% of Tier I or $10 million, whichever is higher. 
Borrowings for export finance and subordinated debt are outside this 
ceiling. 
Investments by NRIs in 
immoveable property 
NRIs are permitted to freely acquire immoveable property (other than 
agricultural land, plantations and farmhouses). There are no 
restrictions regarding the number of such properties to be acquired. 
The only restriction is that where the property is acquired out of inward 
remittances, the repatriation is restricted to the principal amount for two 
residential properties. [There is no such restriction in respect of 
commercial property.] 
NRIs are also permitted to obtain housing loans for acquiring property 
in India and repayment of such loans by close relatives is also 
permitted. 




Measures to manage capital outflows 
 Current  regulations 
Direct investment 
overseas by corporates 
and registered 
partnerships 
Allowed up to 400% of the net worth under the Automatic Route.  
With a view to providing greater flexibility to Indian parties for 
investment abroad, it has been decided to allow Indian companies to 
invest in excess of 400% of their net worth, as on the date of the last 
audited balance sheet, in the energy and natural resources sectors 
such as oil, gas, coal and mineral ores with the prior approval of the 
Reserve Bank.  
AD Category I banks may allow remittance up to 400% of the net worth 
of the Indian entities to invest in overseas unincorporated entities in the 
oil sector after ensuring that the proposal has been approved by the 
competent authority and is duly supported by a certified copy of the 
Board Resolution approving such investment. 
Direct investment 
overseas by exporter 
proprietorships 
Specific approval subject to conditions. 
Portfolio investment by 
Indian listed companies 
Allowed up to 50% of the net worth in listed shares and rated and listed 
debt instruments.  




(i)  $200,000 for permissible capital and current accounts during a 
financial year. 
(ii) Qualification shares  (ii)  1% of share capital with remittance restricted to $20000. 
(iii) Shares of JV/WOS 




(iii) $10,000 per employee in block of five years. 






(iv) $50,000 in block of five years. 
(v) ESOP, inheritance  (v) Permitted. 
Domestic mutual funds 
in various overseas 
instruments 
Mutual funds can now invest overseas up to $7 billion in a wide range 
of instruments.  
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  Current regulations (cont) 




ECBs  Prepayment of ECBs up to $500 million can be allowed by 
AD  Category I banks without prior approval of the Reserve Bank 
subject to compliance with the minimum average maturity period as 
applicable to the loan. 
Lending by Indian 
subsidiary to overseas 
parent 
Case by case. 
Bank lending overseas 
subsidiaries of Indian 
companies 
Restricted to 20% of net worth and to JV/WOS of Indian companies 
with at least 51% Indian shareholding. 
 260  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
Annex 2:  
Measures towards fuller capital  
account convertibility 
Recommendations by 
Tarapore Committee (2006) 
(i)  The Committee recommends that the overall ECB ceiling as also the ceiling for 
automatic approval should be gradually raised. Rupee denominated ECB (payable 
in foreign currency) should be outside the ECB ceiling.  
(ii)  The Committee has concerns about the volume of trade credit as there could be 
sudden changes in the availability of such credit.  Furthermore, there are concerns 
as to whether the trade credit numbers are fully captured in the data even while 
noting that suppliers’ credit of less than 180 days are excluded from these data. 
Import-linked short-term loans should be monitored in a comprehensive manner. 
The per transaction limit of $20 million should be reviewed and the scheme 
revamped to avoid unlimited borrowing. 
(iii)  Recognising that Indian industry is successfully building up its presence abroad, 
there is a strong case for liberalising the present limits for corporate investment 
abroad. The Committee recommends that the limits for such outflows should be 
raised in phases from 200% of net worth to 400% of net worth. Furthermore, for 
non-corporate businesses, it is recommended that the limits should be aligned with 
those for corporates. 
(iv)  EEFC Account holders should be provided foreign currency current/savings 
accounts with cheque writing facility and interest bearing term deposits. 
(v)  Project exports should be provided greater flexibility and these facilities should be 
also provided for service exports. 
(vi)  FIIs should be prohibited from investing fresh money raised through PNs. Existing 
PN-holders may be provided an exit route and phased out completely within one 
year.  
(vii)  The Committee recommends that non-resident corporates should be allowed to 
invest in the Indian stock markets through SEBI-registered entities including mutual 
funds and Portfolio Management Schemes who will be individually responsible for 
fulfilling Know your Customer (KYC) and Financial Action Task Force (FATF) norms. 
The money should come through bank accounts in India. 
(viii)  At present, only multilateral institutions are allowed to raise rupee bonds in India.  To 
encourage, selectively, the raising of rupee denominated bonds, the Committee 
recommends that other institutions/corporates should be allowed to raise rupee 
bonds (with an option to convert into foreign exchange) subject to an overall ceiling 
which should be gradually raised. 
(ix)  The banks’ borrowing facilities are at present restrictive though there are various 
special facilities which are outside the ceiling. The Committee recommends that the 
limits for borrowing overseas should be linked to paid-up capital and free reserves, 
and not to unimpaired Tier I capital, as at present, and raised gradually to 100% by 
2010/11. Ultimately, all types of external liabilities of banks should be within an 
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(x)  At present, only mutual funds are permitted to invest overseas subject to stipulations 
for each fund. The Committee recommends that the various stipulations on 
individual fund limits and the proportion in relation to NAV should be abolished. The 
overall ceilings should be raised from the present level of $2 billion to $3 billion in 
Phase I (2006/07), to $4 billion in Phase II (by 2008/09) and to $5 billion in Phase III 
(by 2010/11). The Committee further recommends that these facilities should be 
available, apart from Mutual Funds, to SEBI registered portfolio management 
schemes. 
(xi)  The present facility for individuals to freely remit $25,000 per calendar year enables 
individuals to open foreign currency accounts overseas. The Committee 
recommends that this annual limit be successively raised to $50,000 in Phase I, 
$100,000 in Phase II and $200,000 in Phase III. Difficulties in operating this scheme 
should be reviewed.  Since this facility straddles the current and capital accounts, 
the Committee recommends that where current account transactions are restricted, 
ie gifts, donations and travel, these should be raised to an overall ceiling of $25,000 
without any sub-limit.  
(xii)  At present only NRIs are allowed to maintain FCNR(B) and NR(E)RA deposits. The 
Committee recommends that non-residents (other than NRIs) should also be 
allowed access to these deposit schemes. Since NRIs enjoy tax concessions on 
FCNR(B) and NR(E)RA deposits, it would be necessary to provide 
FCNR(B)/NR(E)RA deposit facilities as separate and distinct schemes for non-
residents (other than NRIs) without tax benefits. In Phase I, the NRs (other than 
NRIs) could be first provided the FCNR(B) deposit facility, without tax benefits, 
subject to KYC/FATF norms. In Phase II, the NR(E)RA deposit scheme, with cheque 
writing facility, could be provided to NRs (other than NRIs) without tax benefits after 
the system has in place KYC/FATF norms. The present tax regulations on FCNR(B) 
and NR(E)RA deposits for NRIs should be reviewed by the government.  
(xiii)  At present, only NRIs are allowed to invest in companies on the Indian stock 
exchanges subject to certain stipulations. The Committee recommends that all 
individual non-residents should be allowed to invest in the Indian stock market 
through SEBI registered entities including mutual funds and Portfolio Management 
Schemes who will be responsible for meeting KYC and FATF norms and that the 
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